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Last updated: 12:00:00 AM GMT(+03) Sunday, 14, December, 2014
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Houthis from day 1: How did they emerge to power in Yemen? teen pregnancy link how much for a abortion i love my wife but i want to cheat site i want my wife to cheat tracking phone calls and text messages click spyware for text messages |
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The Houthis remain a group difficult to definitively characterize as military, religious, or political in nature, especially since the 2011 revolution and subsequent peace talks. The Houthis as a political entity can be traced to a Zaydi cultural advocacy group called the Faithful Youth (al-Shabab al-Mu’min) that came to prominence in the early 1990s in the aftermath of Yemen’s unification (Freeman, 2009). They took the name “Houthi” after the 2004 assassination of their first leader, Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi, whose brother Abdul Malik al-Houthi leads the group today. These two prominent al-Houthis are the sons of Sheikh Badr al-Din al-Houthi, the Houthi spiritual leader and prominent Zaydi cleric who helped found and then shunned Hizb al-Haqq, the mainstream Zaydi political party of the newly-united Yemen in the 1990s, in dissatisfaction with its policies of cooperation with the GPC regime and compromise on Zaydi principles (Haykel, 1999, p. 199). Seven phases of armed conflict between the Houthis and the central government took place between 2004 and a 2010 ceasefire, resulting in some 299,000 internally displaced persons in the north, including 7,000 living in the UNHCR Mazriq camp near Sa’ada. These clashes, known collectively as the Sa’ada Wars, were originally sparked by a governmental attempt to arrest Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi, although other factors, such as regional underdevelopment and anger at government policies on the domestic and international level, contributed to bringing the conflict to the point of violence. Since then, the Houthi motivation behind armed conflict boiled down to simple dissatisfaction with and defense against the centralized Saleh government (Boucek, 2010, p. 4). Government officials, however, maintain that the conflicts are rooted in class conflict and a struggle between modern Zaydis (like Saleh) and their more traditional counterparts as exemplified by the Houthi family. As mercenaries from other tribes were introduced as pro-government forces in 2007, the conflict took on an inter-tribal character as well (Clark, 2010, p. 247, 251). In 2009, the Yemeni government embarked upon what they termed Operation Scorched Earth, an offensive which was meant by Saleh to crush the Houthis for good, but which instead incurred high levels of collateral damage and drew allegations of American and Saudi involvement in combat (Boucek, 2010, p. 9). The latter accusation was later supported by cables made public in the Wikileaks scandal. Effects of the Revolution and its Fallout Hopes ran high that the February 2012 fall of President Saleh, known for his animosity toward the Houthi, would present a golden opportunity for reconciliation and resolution of the conflict. Analysts looked to conciliatory statements issued by Houthi leadership, such as one which expressed personal hope for the GCC plan if it put an end to outside interference and maintained regional autonomy. In December 2011, UN envoy to Yemen, Jamal bin Omar met with opposition leaders in the country and concluded that the situation called for Houthi participation as “a political party and political power, not as a militia or insurgency.” Likewise, the visit of the governmental liaison committee in January 2012 to Sa’ada and their civil meeting there with Abdul Malik al-Houthi was hailed by the head of the committee as “fruitful and at a high level of importance…a success which will have a positive impact on the success of the National Dialogue.” Especially promising was the February 2012 offer of a personal apology from Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, an Islah member of a prominent political family, and the military general who headed governmental forces in battling the Houthi, though analysts pointed out the strategic timing of the announcement two days before elections. The Houthis called the apology “good for a start,” but spokesman Muhammad Abdul Salaam emphasized the need for a broadening of the process of national reconciliation. However, in September 2012, local parties expressed their opposition to any official governmental apology to the people of Sa’ada for their suffering as suggested by the Preparatory Committee for the National Dialogue. Houthi leader Dhaif Allah al-Shami had greeted such an offer with cautious hope, stating that the realization of this apology would pave the way for consolidation of “fraternity bonds” between Yemenis. However, Salafi spokesman in Sa’ada Sheikh Sarour Al-Wada’i characterized any such apology as a great betrayal to the people of Sa’ada, the military, and those killed in the Sa’ada Wars, warning that it could lead to renewed hostilities. Even the more moderate Islah representative in the province of al-Jawf, Abdul Hamid al-A’mar, called a governmental apology a dishonor to the Yemeni people and called instead for investigation of the past wars and reparation to the victims and displaced. Since November 2011, following the governmental signing of the Houthi-opposed Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) agreement, armed clashes have broken out anew between Houthi and Salafi forces, as well as between Houthis and members of local rival tribes, prompting government warnings against what they view as foreign-backed expansionist actions. Al-Houthi maintains that the military engagements have been defensive, seeking autonomy rather than expansion. Traditional mediation techniques have had some efficacy in addressing these clashes, but Zaid al-Shami, an MP and one of the mediation committee members, blames the Houthis for inciting hostilities anew by imposing their Zaydi Islam on local communities. Members of the Houthis took part in the 2011 revolution, with al-Houthi himself sending unarmed supporters to Sana’a to support the movement. In addition to being a venue to expressing dissatisfaction with the Saleh regime, the revolution also served Houthi interests by distracting governmental forces from their engagements in Sa’ada. However, the Houthis opposed the power transfer agreement backed by America and put forth by the Gulf Cooperation Council, a body headquartered in SaudiaArabia, the country which in 2009 took part in Yemeni government military action in Sa’ada. Like many other opposition groups involved in the 2011 revolution, the Houthis objected to the inclusion in the agreement of immunity from prosecution for former president Saleh. Skepticism reigned among many opposition groups even after Saleh signed the power-transfer agreement in November 2011, as he had begun to do so and then backed out three times before. The terms of the transfer included Saleh’s leaving office within thirty days, at which point Abd Rabbo Mansur al-Hadi, then vice-president, was to take power as interim president until elections were held in 90 days. The Houthis were accordingly stringent in their boycotting the subsequent one-party elections held throughout the country. While al-Houthi stated that the electoral process in the northwest would not be obstructed by Houthi forces, only one polling station was open in Sa’ada and it offered voters the choice to abstain from dipping their finger in ink for fear of Houthiretribution. In June 2012, al-Houthi accepted the invitation to take part in the National Dialogue “because we [Houthis] believe in the values of the revolution in addition to our desire to respond to the people's aspirations to build a just civil state.” Houthispokesperson Saleh Habra stressed, though, that both dialogue and the bearing of arms are integral parts of Houthi culture and will continue. However, in October 2012, the Houthis published a list of ten preset conditions for participation in the national dialogue, including a reduction in the price of petroleum and essential commodities, admission that the SaadaWars were a mistake, removal of regime figures implicated in killings, and public statement by the parties of their stances on American violations of Yemeni national sovereignty. While the conditions also denounced foreign influence on the process, they counted United Nations guidance as “no problem” (Sharqieh, p. 27-8). In an earlier statement, Islah spokesperson Muhammad Qahtan allowed for the possibility of addressing such concerns should the Houthis disarm: “We support recognizing their grievances, compensation, apology, whatever they need, but no weapons” (Sharqieh, p. 13). As the NDC drew to a close in late 2013 and early 2014, the Houthis participated more fully in the process through their political arm, Ansar Allah. However, after the assassinations of Houthi representatives Abdel KarimJadban and Dr. Ahmed Sharaf al-Deen in November 2013 and January 2014, respectively, other Houthi MPs became unwilling to continue attending NDC meetings. Ultimately, the Houthi representatives boycotted the NDC closing and expressed their opposition to the six-region plan, expressing fears that it “divides Yemen into poor and wealthy” regions. Press and public relations: The Houthis express their official views in a fashion suitable to the age, through the media outlet AnsarAllah ("The Supporters of God") and the television stational-Masirah ("The Walk"), which frequently feature appearances of Abdul Malik al-Houthi. These sources operate with relative freedom in Yemen, although al-Masirah reported in late August 2012 on their Facebook page that the channel was facing interference from an unknown source. Ansar Allah maintains active Facebook and Twitter accounts, as well as their newspaper and main website, headed by their slogan, “One eye on the Qur’an and one eye on [current] events.” The Ansar Allah website provides local, regional, and world news and provides archives of downloadable audio, video, and images, including sermons and Qur’anic lessons. The newspaper, called “The Truth,” runs under the motto, “May our standards remain Qur’anic,” and runs opinion and news pieces. The Houthi public relations effort is perhaps best known for use of their slogan, “God is Great, Death to America, Death to Israel, a curse on the Jews,” used in propaganda materials, protests, and even as part of sermons during Friday prayers. Houthi rhetoric is dominated by opposition to outside incursions into their affairs, either interpreted as Sunni/Salafi oppression of Zaydi religion or international influence on internal Yemeni affairs. Among the frequent topics of Houthi statements, then, is the danger of sectarianism and hegemony of one ethnic or religious group, as reflected in a 2011 publication entitled “The Creative Revolution”, in which “Bush the Son” is accused of having attempted to create a new Middle East through the weapon of sectarianism, only to be foiled by the Arab Spring. Likewise, another publicationaccuses Saudi Arabia of fomenting divisive sectarianism and tribalism in the region. The negative portrayal of non-Sunni Muslims in government textbooks formed a part of the original Houthi grievances and among the Houthi demands upon the National Dialogue is an end to provocative sectarian speeches. Relations with Other Groups Though based in their tribal homelands in the northwestern province of Sa’ada, the influence of the Houthis has spread throughout Yemen. In the capital of Sana’a, young, urban members of the Shabab al-Sumud(“Steadfast Youth”), support the Houthi cause as one of many within a larger framework of religious revival, justice, and political rights, many of them having never visited Sa’ada. The Shabab al-Sumud, like the Houthisthemselves, oppose outside interference in Yemeni affairs and especially Western dominance, and include among the crimes of the former regime the killing of thousands in Sa’ada. The group maintains several active Facebook pages and groups, including one in English for the benefit of foreign journalists, as well as a YouTube channel and an RSS feed. In October 2013, conflict brought out in Sa’ada once more, this time between the Houthis and the Salafis of Dar al-Hadith in Dammaj. While accounts of the conflict are hard to verify, Houthi sources accused the school of housing weapons and foreign fighters, while other sources accused the Houthis of being the aggressors against dormitories and mosques full of students, women, and children. Government mediators negotiated several ceasefires only to have them broken within a day by a conflict in which more than one hundred died. The final ceasefire was implemented January 10, 2014, and stipulated that all non-local students at Dar al-Hadith must be evacuated to the more stable town of Hodeida, frustrating observers who saw this as the government’s giving in to Houthi demands. Local groups in Hodeida refused to receive the Salafis, however, due to the possibility of renewed violence, and so some 10,000 Salafis became homeless in Sana’a, leading to tensions with locals. Given their sectarian background, it is logical that many of the Sunni religious authorities and groups in Yemen do not look kindly upon the Houthis. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), especially, is known for their hostility toward the movement, so much so that AQAP’s shar’ia council issued a fatwa regarding the killing of the “Shi’a Houthis.” The accusations set against the Houthiincluded those traditionally leveled at Shi’a, like the degradation of Aisha, the companions of the Prophet, and the first two caliphs, and some more specific, as in the imposition of un-Islamic Shi’a rule and the killing of women and children in attacks on Muslim villages. Therefore, the council ruled that fighting the Houthis was a duty under shar’ia upon all able Muslims, citing the Qur’an and the writings of proto-Salafi theologian IbnTaymiyya. In response to the October 2013 clash in Dammaj, AQAP issued a statement of solidarity with the Salafi students and promised revenge against the Houthis. Even more moderate religious authorities have expressed support for fighting the Houthis. In 2007, Sheikh Mohamed bin Ismail al-‘Amrani, a well-known Yemeni judge and member of the World Association of Islamic Scholars, issued his own fatwa describing fighting the Houthis as a “mandatory jihad” because of their being outside of the Muslim community. Citing the Qur’an, al-‘Amrani ruled that the Zaydi sect is innocent of the actions of the Houthis and that all able citizens must support the government in battling the movement. Unsurprisingly given their slogan, the Houthis are known for their hostility toward Jewish communities in Yemen, an issue which provided the spark for the 2007 phase of armed conflict. The Yemeni Jewish community in Sa’ada province, already few in number, moved wholesale from their homes to government-supported housing in Sana’a following Houthi death threats in 2010. Members of this community report that their homes were destroyed after they fled. Before their departure, each family was reportedly delivered a note from the Houthis which ordered them to leave within ten days or face the consequences due to their undermining of community morality and their service to Zionism (Al-Daghshi, 2010, p. 44). After the 2011 revolution, the status of these few refugees is once more uncertain, although they continue to receive government stipends and housing under Mansur al-Hadi. The Houthis have long held an uneasy relationship with Hizb al-Haqq, the mainstream Zaydi political party, with the original Shabab al-Mu’min cutting tiesto the party because it seemed incapable of meaningful political progress. Among the leaders of the Houthi movement, Hussein al-Houthi was a founding member of the Hizbal-Haqq who later left it, while his brother Yahya al-Houthi was a GPC representative. During the 2005 phase of the Sa’ada Wars, however, the Saleh government accused both Hizb al-Haqq and the Union of Popular Forces of terrorism and supporting the rebellion (Boucek, 2010, p. 6). Like Hizb al-Haqq, the Union of Popular Forces is a member of the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), the established opposition group, and is perceived by some as being Zaydi-dominated. The Union supports decentralized government as one of its main goals, but just as emphatically rejects the use of violence, so it is likely in both cases that the charges were politically motivated. At the time, Saleh asserted that the “rebels and outlaws” he fought in Sa’ada were in fact the armed wing of Hizb al-Haqq and the Union of Popular Forces, “formed with the intention…of overthrowing the republican system.” In January 2012, a number of Zaydi politicians, many of them former members of Hizb al-Haqq, formed the new Hizb al-Umma. Reports conflict as to the level of Houthiinfluence upon the party, from the Tehran-based source which triumphantly dubbed the new party “an official political front which will allow the [Houthis] to enter into political elections and spread the group’s methodology on a political scale,” to an independent south Yemeni news source which merely quoted the founder, Muhammad Muftih, in declaring that Hizb al-Umma will live out its name, “the party of the community.” The official statement declared further that the party is Yemeni in origin, Arabic in affiliation, and Islamic in identity.
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By Abdulrahman Yacoob FOR THE YEMEN POST
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