By Mahdi Muhsen
FOR THE YEMEN POST

It seems that the ceasefire in northern Yemen and determination to seek a radical solution to the Saada crisis has become a key priority not only of the government but also of the people in Saada province in the far north.
However, this is not all that the Houthi rebels wish after fighting the army for almost six years, gaining experience in forming demands and seeking radical solutions to the crisis.
On the eve of the ceasefire, phone calls overcrowded in Saada between the refugees from the recently-ended war and those who stayed in the city.
This occurred due to the limited number of land and cell phones in the hands of the Saada people and was a sign of a strong welcome of the people of the ceasefire that marked the start of calm in the city devastated by war for years.

An Equation of Concessions:
The coming days hold what will follow the ceasefire….just as it happened after the ceasefire that ended the fourth war between the army and the insurgents when the government itself criticized the agreement with the rebels. Still, peaceful solutions whatever happens, remain better than continuing the war.
Success comes under concessions by the conflict parties. But it is worth to mention two things: the first is about a question on the fate of the tribes which supported the armed forces against the Houthi group.
The ending of the war was up to the army and the group, while the war remains between the pro-government tribes and the pro-Houth tribes.
The last ceasefire did not call for ensuring that further raids on the pro-government tribes must be stopped; however, the government focused on that condition that the rebels stop attacking the Saudi lands. And if the government insisted on including the tribes in the ceasefire, it would ensure resolving one of the post- war consequences, relating to the social aspect.
The contact between the government and the Houthi group resulted in the acceptance of the group of the timetable for implementing the ceasefire, though the rebels had demands that were met by the understanding of the government.
Among the demands were that the Houthi group would not be socially and politically marginalized, releasing Houthi captives, engaging the opposition to establish a suitable mechanism for the ceasefire, the group be part of the committees overseeing the implementation of the ceasefire and delaying the term of returning equipment until the other terms are completely implemented.
Also, the group made clear that they had a desire to join the opposition coalition in a sign of their tendency to form a political party to represent themselves.
These were the most important things that contributed to the ceasefire and that received the understanding of the government. However, they were not as overtures for the rebels to accept the ceasefire terms after bloody clashes with the army in Saada. In this regard, officials were optimistic about the success of the efforts to end the war, a matter that implied guarantees at a low level at least at the present time.

International pressure to end the military operations:
It came across to the minds of those who said that the international community pressured the government to stop the military operations against the Houthi group in the far north areas to shift its attention to other major international dangers such as Al-Qaeda.
Yemen receives considerable support to build its abilities to counter terrorism. It is true such pressure was a contributing factor to the ceasefire but remained a desire of the international community that was not basically aimed at pressuring the government on Saada.
Yemen’s position over putting an end to the war was clear since the confrontations resumed in August last year that the rebels should accept the ceasefire conditions.
Looking at the six terms of the ceasefire announced by the government and that were accepted by the rebels last month, we find there was no difference between their first and last versions. Hence, it seems good to stop and answer a question that is what were the new and emergency things of the situation particularly when the terms accepted by the rebels were the same announced when the confrontations started in August 2009?
Was it not suitable for the Houthi group to accept them at the start of the war to avoid casualties and big losses from both sides? Was it not suitable for the group to accept the terms at the beginning of the confrontations that were unchanged when they accepted them at last?
And it is also true that blows the group received from the army particularly after brining in Saudi Arabia into the conflict, even under the pretext of defending its lands, were a boosting factor to the ceasefire, thought the rebels fought and held on.
The second thing lies in two things; the first comes from the desire of the rebels to allow them to exercise their constitutional rights and form their own political party.
The second thing is related to the term on the rebel weapons that called during the initial efforts that the rebels hand over their arms even it this would take place in return for something.
The last ceasefire between the government and the Houthi did not include this term and only focused on returning military and civilian equipment that were taken during the war.
This means the rebels will stay having their weapons including medium and heavy ones to be an armed party after Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Despite the difference between the Houthi movement and Hezbollah, the matter may lead other parties to think to experience a similar experiment and then the democratic process in Yemen will be supported with factors including arms in a country that suffers from uncontrolled arms across its parts.