Written By: Claude
Salhani *
Article Date: September 29, 2008
Nothing could be more
logical than a peace deal between Israel and Syria, yet the “illogical”
logic often driving Middle East politics indicates that the most
rational policy for both sides is to maintain the status quo.
The current state
of no war, no peace has taxed both countries in terms of military
spending and resources that could otherwise have been invested in the
economy.
It’s not as though
the money could not be used elsewhere.
And now Russia,
only too happy to get back at Israel and the United States for their
support of Georgia in the recent imbroglio in the Caucasus over Abkhazia
and South Ossetia is responding to Syria’s demand for Russian air
defence missiles.
Following a
meeting between Syrian President Bashar Assad and Russian President
Dmitry Medvedev in the Black Sea resort of Sochi last August, Russia has
agreed to sell Syria Pantsir surface-to-air missiles and Buk-M12
surface-to-surface missiles.
An earlier request
by Syria for S-300 air defence systems and short-range Iskander missiles
were scrapped after Washington applied pressure on the Russians. But
that was B.C. - Before the Caucasus.
This continued
existence in political limbo has dragged on now for the good part of 35
years, ever since Henry Kissinger, then secretary of State, brokered a
ceasefire between Damascus and Jerusalem after the outbreak of the
October 1973 war.
Despite overtures
from Damascus, peace between Israel and Syria — the only front-line Arab
state still in a state of war with Israel remains a distant prospect.
This time it is
Israel that does not look at peace with Syria as being advantageous to
its national interests. At least, not for now.
The Israeli-Syrian
dispute, according to Israeli Major-General Giora Eiland, a former
director of Israel’s national security council, is much less complicated
than the Israeli-Palestinian dispute which involves finalising borders
between the two countries; agreeing over the status of Jerusalem, a city
holy to Jews, Muslims and Christians, and claimed by both the Israelis
and the Palestinians as their capital; and the ‘sticky wicket’ of
ongoing Palestinian-Israeli dialogue, the “right of return” of
Palestinian refugees who fled Palestine in 1948 and 1967.
“The
Israeli-Syrian dispute is simpler,” Eiland told a conference in Europe a
fortnight ago. Unlike the Palestinian issue where border demarcation
remains hazy with each side arguing over the exact trajectory of the
future border, further complicated by the fact that it’s a dispute
between a state (Israel) and at least two different organisations:
Fatah, a secular entity ruling over much of the West Bank, and Hamas, a
strictly Islamist organisation calling for the destruction of Israel.
The retired
Israeli army general pointed out, the dispute with Syria is unambiguous.
“It’s a territorial dispute between two countries.” In this case the
borders between Syria and Israel are pre-established and recognised. Any
peace deal will demand that Israel return to Syria the Golan Heights
occupied during the 1967 Six-Day War.
This is a
generally recognised fact that Israel has come to accept as the price of
peace with Syria.
Still, there
remain divergences between the two sides, of course. The big difference
said Eiland jokingly, is that “we call it the Golan and the Syrians call
it the Jolan.”
Then there is the
problem of water rights, one that Eiland finds within the realm of
“achievable” problems. There is even a Syrian peace proposal on the
table, and the good offices of Turkey playing the middleman, trying to
mediate between Jerusalem and Damascus.
Is peace between
Syria and Israel achievable? “Yes,” replies the former army general.
However, Eiland gives a number of reasons why peace between Israel and
Syria remains unlikely to become a reality anytime soon; and why the
Israeli government is not terribly excited about the prospect of peace
with Syria.
1. From the
Israeli perspective, peace with Syria will not help the
Israeli-Palestinian issue
2. It will
not help the Iran dossier.
3. It will
not help solve the problem of Hezbollah in Lebanon.
4. Even if
the problem with Syria is solved, it is not going to help solve other
problems.
5. Peace
with Syria means returning the Golan to the Syrians, which translates
into an increased security risk, which means an increase in the risk of
war. Therefore, the status quo becomes more appealing.
6. Syrian
President Bashar Assad is not about to follow in the footsteps of the
late Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and fly to Jerusalem.
7. Then
there is this additional caveat — the one “recommends” to Israel by the
United States — that they avoid talking to the Syrians.
And finally there
is the fact that since the end of hostilities on the Golan in 1973, not
a single bullet was fired across the demarcation line policed by 1046
troops, 57 military observers and 43 civilians from UNDOF — the United
Nations Disengagement Observer Force. So if it hasn’t broken, why fix
it?
Suddenly the logic
of the illogic begins to make sense; so far as anything that illogical
can enter into the realm of logic.
Claude Salhani is editor of the Middle
East Times and a political analyst in Washington